



The aim is to spark wider discussion about our future force and in particular the Chief's question: 'what does an Army of 5000 (plus reserve forces, civilians and volunteers) look like?'

What is Force Design?

It's been said that 'if you don't like change you'll like irrelevance even less.'

Organisations that do not periodically refresh themselves find that their strategies, structures and systems can become barriers to efficiency and effectiveness – even if they had previously worked well. Force design is a methodical review to ensure the 'form' of the Army (shape, size, structure, and accountabilities) matches its purpose and the challenges posed by current and future operational realities.

In a complex organisation like the Army design is iterative (happening on every level all of the time). However, there is an underlying hierarchy of considerations.

The first and most important thing is to understand the drivers of change and to agree a 'concept' that allows us (and those who follow us) to achieve the Army and NZDF purpose and meet the future's challenges and opportunities. The Future Land Operating Concept 2035 (FLOC 35) is designed to start that debate. Second, we then 'organise' to achieve our concept. Third, we 'systemise' to align our tactics and processes so we can achieve our objectives as efficiently as possible. Fourth, we make long term equipment and infrastructure decisions that support our concept and 'optimise' our ability to win.

Army General Staff's force design team are primarily focused on the first two levels of the hierarchy: but given the iterative nature of design, they work closely with capability projects like the Network Enabled Army, Protected Mobility and Soldier Modernisation as well as infrastructure regeneration via the Consolidated Logistic Project and Defence Estate Regeneration Programme.

What are the drivers of change?


The FLOC 35 argues that the security environment is changing. Globalisation, population growth, proliferation and the information age mean that the environment is more connected and monitored, more crowded and more lethal. The result is that future missions will be more complex as adversaries exploit the intersection of these pressures. To succeed in this environment we need to work more closely with partners – we need an integrated approach.

FORCE DESIGN

Principles


- In-step with NZDF Intent
- Future orientated
- Relevant
- Mission-focused
- Multi-purpose
- Deployable
- Interoperable
- Affordable

Hierarchy



The diagram below shows the integration of our roles along a spectrum – with enemy centric operations at one end, where we will be called upon to combat adversaries, and human centric operations at the other end in which we respond to disasters and support civil authorities. Operations in the middle aim to maintain the stability of the international

order. Each of the three securities is connected. Partnering with others to support **human security** builds resilience and prevents destabilising pressures from undermining **systemic security** – which if let run would ultimately put **sovereign security** at risk.






Figure 1.

To meet the challenges of the security spectrum the FLOC 35 proposes five integrated land missions. The first is information activities (inform). In the information age, all missions will need to be conducted in the context of the first mission. Second is Joint Land Combat (combat). NZDF is the only organisation that can deliver this for New Zealand. Third and fourth are population protection (protect) and capacity building (build), fifth is population support (support). The diagram above shows how these missions intersect (see Fig. 1). The underlying idea is that combat capability is the bedrock of our effectiveness. Capacity building is our fulcrum: we prevent conflict by building resilience and we help resolve conflicts by rebuilding institutions.

The future Army will need to both fight and build. In combat missions we will need to fight then build. In support missions we will build to prevent a fight. And in protection missions we may have to fight and build at the same time.

To deliver these effects, the FLOC 35 argues that the NZ Army requires four fundamental characteristics (see Fig. 2):

- First, and by definition the NZ Army is a **light fighting force**. Some nations have light, medium and heavy forces. Given New Zealand's location and resources the NZ Army is a light-force based on its size and firepower.
- Second, if we are light we need to be **agile**. We need to

be quick on our feet – we need to be multi-purpose, we need to be able to transition between tasks quickly and be able to scale up and down as required.

- Third, in an increasingly lethal environment we need to be **precise**. We must use our limited resources for the greatest impact and be able to see and understand better than our adversaries so we can shield ourselves from attack. Consequently, digitising the force is the NZ Army's main effort for capability development.
- Fourth, we need to be **force multipliers**. We multiply our ability to exert force and influence through tactics, resourcing decisions and relationships that enable our effects to be exponentially greater than the sum of the Army's parts – we need to be able to punch above our weight.

Given this context, we need to ask and answer some hard questions if we are to achieve all we need to within an Army of 5000.

Light Fighters – Ko wai tatou?

Firstly, how do we define ourselves as light fighters? The FLOC argues that we need combat soldiers that are dismounted (light infantry), mounted (equipped with protected mobility) and light armoured (equipped with light fighting vehicles).

Therefore, the light fighter's doctrine is a philosophical and conceptual approach. It includes, but is not restricted to, light infantry structures. If you agree with this, we need to consider how to structure our units to best achieve the agility, precision and multiplier effects we seek.

Currently we have organised our two Regular Force infantry battalions as light infantry and use combined arms exercises to ready them for mounted and light armoured manoeuvre. Another option would be to focus each battalion on a role. For instance, one Battalion might remain as light infantry kept at higher readiness and trained to work closely with air, amphibious and special operations forces – perhaps able to operate along similar lines to commando fighting columns. The other Battalion could be equipped for mounted operations




Figure 2.

that give it greater tactical resilience and reach, especially in open country and urban areas. Currently light armour is vested in Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles, and there are options to enhance this, perhaps with additional reservists. Alternatively, we could focus it towards reconnaissance and surveillance.

These are important questions because they impact the long term equipment decisions we are making. For instance, if you think we should remain light infantry based you are also arguing that we should place the bulk of our protected mobility assets with our combat support and combat service support troops. Each option has pluses and minuses.

Organise by trade or by task?

Deciding if land forces should be task organised or functionally organised along regimental and trade lines is a recurrent debate. Generally, a force should be task organised if their mission is clearly defined and there is limited time for pre-deployment training. An example is the High Readiness Company: it needs to train with all its enablers to be effective at short notice. If there are many potential missions to prepare for and sufficient lead time to integrate force elements, then forces are best employed in their functional units where they can develop their professional excellence and periodically practise combined arms skills.

The force design team is interested in your views on how you think we can balance the competing pressures of professional excellence and combined arms excellence. Should we retain the current regimental structures or move to a task organised model, or is there a hybrid of the two? For instance should we create a task group in the South Island based on 2nd/1st Battalion and leave the North Island units structured along functional lines to ensure the Army's wider agility. If so, what focus would you give the South Island Task Group?

Affordability: part time vs full time balance?

As our force becomes more technical the cost of personnel increases. Most of our international partners are addressing this by finding new ways to leverage their Reserve Forces so that they can retain a highly professional workforce without losing the ability to scale up quickly. Clever use of Reservists also enables the Army to reach into the market place and access niche skills that are not cost effective to generate in house. Currently, we are investigating focusing the three Reserve Battalions on civil defence, community engagement and the supply of soldiers to Reserve Force sub-units that are integrated into 1 (NZ) Brigade's Regular Force units. This would mean adding Reserve Force Companies to 1st and 2nd/1st Battalions. What are your views on this? How can we better use reserves to give us a wider talent pool? How would you integrate reserves into your unit better? Can we do that?

How do we keep up with and exploit the technology wave?

Accelerating technology means some Corps and trades need to evolve and even potentially reinvent themselves. With the advent of the 'man-machine team' on the horizon, robotics is one such driver. How will this impact your area? What sensible things can we explore now to prepare for the future? Digitisation via the Network Enabled Army is another driver that will force a cultural change on the Army. How can we leverage its power to improve our Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance capabilities? What do you think the implications are for our future work force? Digitisation will improve our ability to distribute forces more widely in an operational area – how will this impact on your tactics and organisational structures, what risks will this create that you need to find solutions to?

How can you be involved?

According to computer scientist, Alan Kay 'the best way to predict the future is to invent it.' The questions above are just primers; there are many others that will need to be addressed as we chart our future. As members of the NZDF and the NZ Army we are all kaitiaki (guardians). As such, all of us regardless of rank or role need to debate our concepts and look for better ways of doing business.

Options for you to have your say include the following:

- Read the FLOC 35.
- Engage with your commanders and Regimental Colonels. All of the Army's Regimental Colonels are currently conducting a mission analysis and will back brief the Chief of Army later in October.
- Use "SMA's blog" to propose and debate ideas.
- Contact force design project leader, Lieutenant Colonel Murray Brown murray.brown@nzdf.mil.nz
- Contribute to the Chief of Army's Seminar 2018 (CASEM18), which will focus on force design and be held in the second quarter of 2018.
- Innovate in your area.

Kia Rite (Be Ready)